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INTRODUCTION  
 
Many retail investors seek the assistance of financial advisors to acquire or confirm 
information on which to make an informed investment decision. Financial advisors promote a 
variety of products to their retail clients but their detailed knowledge of those products can 
vary greatly as can their promotion of certain products over others. Financial advisors may be 
independent from, work for, or be associated with various product originators. The nature of 
the relationship between financial advisors and product originators may impact on the extent 
and quality of information advisors have and their motivation to promote the originators’ 
products. Those who originate financial products have greater knowledge about their products 
than advisors and advisors in turn have superior knowledge to investors. The difference in 
information, or Information asymmetry, exists between service and product originators and 
consumers in all service and product markets to varying degrees but is particularly 
pronounced in financial markets (Brealey, Leland and Pyle 1977). The asymmetry causes a 
lack of efficiency in the price and quantity of goods and services and leads to inefficient 
allocation of resources and adverse selection of products by retail investors (Bebczuk 2003). 
To reduce information asymmetry in financial markets governments fund financial literacy 
programs and regulate consumer product information. Governments also address information 
asymmetry between product originators and advisors by setting educational and training 
standards of advisors. Despite the best efforts of government, however, cases of financial loss 
caused by inappropriate advice by financial advisors and product selection by consumers 
continue to proliferate. 
The efficient functioning of financial markets is also affected by moral hazard, where 
one party creates risk and another party bears the cost of the risk if things go badly (Krugman 
2009). The case of Westpoint provides a relevant Australian example of moral hazard in 
financial markets. Financial advisors received up to ten per cent commission for selling 
Westpoint’s mezannie products, compared with an average commission of two percent in the 
industry (Westerman, 2006). Those who created and promoted the high risk investment 
products profited while loses were incurred by investors in the company and its investment 
products.   
This paper analyses the factors underlying recent scandals involving Australian 
financial service firms including industry structure, culture, regulation and enforcement. 
Fundamental to such an analysis is an examination of how these factors relate to the 
principles of information asymmetry, adverse selection and moral hazard. The aim of such an 
analysis is to propose strategies to better protect consumers.  
The paper is divided into six parts. Part 2 of this paper provides a review of relevant 
literature on regulation of financial advice, financial literacy and compensation. Part 3 
describes methodology employed in this paper. Part 4 provides a synopsis of the recent 
Australian financial advice scandals. Part 5 provides a discussion of the Australian scandals in 
the light relevant regulation and literature and part 6 provides concluding comments and 
policy implications.  
 
1. MARKET FAILURE AND FINANCIAL ADVICE 
 
Zitzewitz (2014) discusses the sources of market failure which create an economic rationale 
for regulation, in particular information imperfections, that give rise to agency conflicts, and 
potential behavioural limits on investor processing, monitoring and oversight. Zitzewitz 
(2014) notes a recurring pattern of market and regulatory failures in financial markets, 
including the 2008 financial crisis. Accordingly regulatory issues involved in market failure in 
the US finance industry were found to centre on compensation, disclosure, antitrust policy and 
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agency regulation. The same issues that Zitzewitz notes as present in the US are also present 
in Australia and other markets as will be discussed below. 
One of the frequently raised issues in discussions of regulation of financial advice 
involves compensation of financial advisors. Robinson (2007) considers the advantages and 
disadvantages of the three main models of compensation. The traditional commission based 
compensation model has an inherent conflict of interest between advisors and clients in that 
advisors receive commission regardless of how investments perform. There is therefore an 
economic incentive for advisors to direct investors toward products paying the highest 
commissions, even if they are not the most suited for that investor.  Robinson (2007) 
observes that US financial advisors argue this is not problematic because the US financial 
services industry is competitive. Faced with losing clients, advisors will forgo short term 
financial gain. Nevertheless Robinson (2007) notes that there has been substantial criticism of 
the model.  
Robinson (2007) also identifies that the asset fee based model, where advisors’ 
compensation is based on the value of the portfolio, provides some perverse incentives. 
Under this model there is an incentive to advise clients against reducing assets under 
management and little incentive to advise against reducing debt, investing in non-managed 
assets such as property or holding liquid assets.  
The third of the three models presented by Robinson (2007), the flat fee model, has 
been widely discussed in Australia as a panacea for the inherent conflict associated with 
commission models. The flat fee model allows advisors to be compensated for their advice. 
Robinson (2007) argues that, while it may be more objective than other models, advisors 
have no incentive to monitor the performance of investment decisions and may overstate the 
amount of work done to increase their compensation.  
Irrespective of compensation arrangements advisors may still engage in activities 
which increase their own wealth. Appropriate regulation is needed to reduce the potential for, 
and impact of, unethical practices and behaviours. McGillivary and Fung (2013) proposed 
that without proper ethical behaviour a sound financial system is not sustainable and that only 
a finance industry that does no harm to society can successfully fulfil the profit-maximizing 
motive.  
Standards of ethical and professional conduct have implications for how financial 
planning is viewed publicly. Murphy and Watts (2009) considered whether financial planning 
in Australia is an industry or can be considered a profession. They developed a set of 
attributes of professionalism derived from extant literature, including public / societal 
responsibility, a systematic body of theory, professional authority and ethical responsibility, 
and interviewed 78 financial planners to provide attitude statements relating to the attributes. 
Analysis of the statements failed to show a satisfactory level of professionalism for any 
attribute indicating that financial planning had not yet developed into a profession. Further, 
Bruce and Gupta (2011) suggest that minimum training standards set by the Australian 
regulator have allowed private education providers to capture the training and education 
agenda away from the profession with the result that financial planning in Australia could be 
described as an industry rather than a fully fledged profession. The status of the financial 
planning function has clear implications for attracting professionals and how those working 
in the sector see and conduct themselves. 
Governments regulate the disclosure of product information but also consumers to 
take greater responsibility for their own financial decisions than ever before. Worthington 
(2006) amongst others notes low levels of financial literacy exist across the Australian 
community echoing findings in other countries (Calcagno and Monticone 2015). The low 
level of financial literacy across households suggests that they are at risk of making 
suboptimal financial decisions or that they may, in the face of complex or difficult financial 
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situations, chose to do nothing or use non professional sources of information such as the 
internet (Bruhn and Miller 2014). The consequences of doing nothing or relying on 
inappropriate information may be detrimental to their financial health.  
International studies find financial literacy is highly correlated with basic literacy and 
numeracy (Agnew, Bateman, and Thorp 2013) and that the disadvantaged, poorly educated, 
immigrant and elderly all have low levels of financial literacy (Lusardi and Mitchell 2014). 
Further, Finke (2005 p.53) argues that most financial mistakes are made by investors who are 
likely to be less educated and less wealthy and “perceive the highest cost to financial 
education or the least benefit”. The implication of this is that the welfare system may bear the 
cost (or a major cost) of the lack of effective financial education with the poorest incurring 
losses and becoming increasingly welfare dependent. As Finke (2005 p.54) notes, the welfare 
benefit of increased financial education and regulation is “immense”.  
Governments spend considerable amounts of money on financial literacy or financial 
education programs. Braunstein and Welch (2002) note that such programs can provide 
benefits particularly when they have discrete objectives. However, more recent studies have 
cast doubt on the benefits of financial literacy programs generally. Research by Willis (2008), 
Cole and Shastry (2009), Hathaway and Khatiwada (2008), Willis (2009) and Gale and 
Levine (2010) fails to confirm a causal link between financial education, financial literacy, 
improved financial behaviour and improved financial outcomes. Mandell and Klein (2009) 
found US school students who completed a personal financial management course were no 
more financially literate than those who had not. Further, Willis (2008 p.10) notes that firms 
sometimes use financial education as a vehicle to sell products because they fear other forms 
of regulation if they can “not point to financial education as the cure for consumer financial 
woes”. Indeed Willis (2008) proposes that pursuing financial education may be based on 
fallacious arguments and premises. She notes effective financial education is extremely costly 
due, firstly, to low existing levels of financial literacy, secondly, to complexity of financial 
decisions and heterogeneity of consumer circumstances, thirdly, to rapidly changing 
demographics and product offerings and, fourthly, to imbalance of power between industry 
and consumers. Given the variability of investor preferences, experiences and backgrounds 
“financial education would need to be extensive, frequent, and personalized for each 
consumer” (Willis 2008 p.5) and the price to individual consumer time would be enormous. 
While there are many free programs providing financial education these are often seldom 
used (Brown and Gartner 2007) and those who participate in such programs are generally 
better educated and have better financial literacy than those who do not. Hence Willis (2008) 
notes that to lift financial literacy generally would necessitate making financial education 
personalised and mandatory which in all likelihood would be politically untenable and 
financially unviable. 
Our brief examination of the literature highlights the role compensation, ethical practice, 
disclosure and financial literacy play in contributing to consumer loss from market failure. 
Against this background we identify recent regulatory changes with the aim of examining 
how they address the underlying causes of failure and consumer loss. 
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
To examine the causes and consequences of scandals involving financial advisors in Australia 
we adopt a content analysis approach. Content analysis involves the systematic identification 
of themes, images or concepts within a series of media through the use of content categories 
enabling a more objective evaluation than comparing content based on the impressions of the 
researcher (Sarantakos 1993). 
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We searched the Factiva online news archival system using multiple search terms 
including ‘financial advisor’, ‘financial planning’ and ‘ASIC’ (Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission) for articles published over the last decade. Factiva incorporates 276 
Australian publications covering all States and includes newspapers, industry journals, 
magazines and industry reports. It incorporates the two dominant media publishers in 
Australia and accounts for over 90 percent of the daily newspaper sales. The concentrated 
nature of media ownership in Australia, and common practice of reprinting news items 
throughout media groups, validates the use of these online sources.  
We also searched the media releases on the ASIC website for information concerning the 
scandals involving financial advice and advisors. This allowed us to confirm details presented 
in the media and add extra relevant detail. 
 
3. RECENT HISTORY OF AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL ADVICE SCANDALS  
The Australian finance industry is highly concentrated with various estimates suggesting that 
around 80 per cent of the industry is owned/managed by the “Big 5” institutions the four 
major banks (ANZ, CBA, Westpac and NAB) and insurance company AMP. Forbes 
magazine recently put the four largest Australian banks within the largest 25 banks in the 
world (Chen 2015). Each of these institutions operates numerous financial service businesses 
including those providing insurance and funds management; for example, NAB's offers 
financial advice to customers through its NAB Wealth business. NAB Wealth incorporates 
MLC, which includes the bank's life insurance and superannuation businesses, stockbroker JB 
Were, financial planning through firms Meritum, Garvan and Godfrey Pembroke, and the 
NAB-branded financial planning network.  
In recent years there have been a number of scandals involving the loss of customer 
money by improper, unethical and sometimes illegal activities at leading financial service 
firms, including those controlled by the major Australian banks including CBA, NAB and 
ANZ. Other smaller but not insignificant businesses have also engaged in activities which 
resulted in retail investors incurring substantial losses. The names of the companies involved, 
such as Storm Financial, Westpoint, Opes Prime, Trio/Astarra, and Sonray Capital, have gone 
into Australian financial service folklore.  
Table 1 lists details of several of the more notable scandals. As the information in the 
table indicates, the number of investors and amounts involved has been substantial. 
The ultimate sanction imposed on Australian financial advisors is to receive a ban on 
providing financial advice from the corporate regulator, ASIC. The ASIC website 
(www.asic.gov.au) provides details of banned financial advisors including the reasons for the 
ban and length of ban.  During the 5 financial years commencing July 2010 56 advisors were 
banned from operating by ASIC. Table 2 indicates the major reasons for receiving a ban. The 
three leading reasons for receiving a ban were: misappropriation or theft of client money 
(cited on 17 occasions), making false or misleading statements in a material particular (cited 
on 16 occasions) and inducing clients to invest in certain products by making false or 
misleading statements (cited on 15 occasions). Often the cases involving theft of client money 
resulted in the advisor being convicted and jailed. Other reasons for banning include operating 
without a proper licence, failing to provide a reasonable basis for making a decision and 
conducting unauthorised transactions. While the length of ban varied, 31 of the 56 banned 
advisors received a permanent ban. The figure quoted must be interpreted with caution as 
many financial advisors left their employment when their employer uncovered irregularities in 
their conduct. In addition several other advisors received enforceable undertakings orders 
from ASIC (ie to undertake formal approved study). Many of the banned advisors were 
involved in several of the high profile scandals while others worked independently or worked 
for smaller firms. 
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Table 1 Details of notable financial scandals involving Australian financial service firms 
Year  Licensee 
name  
Est. no. 
investors 
and total 
amount 
involved 
Issues involved Resolution 
1993 -
2007 
Storm 
Financiali 
3,000-
4,000 
investors, 
$3 billion 
Inappropriate advice encouraging 
clients to make highly geared 
investments.  
$400 million (approx.) 
settlement with 1,500 clients.  
2004-
2006 
Westpointii 3,524  
investors, 
$388 
million 
New investor money used to service 
existing investments. Planners 
encouraged clients to make bad 
investment and promoters kicked 
back commissions to planners in 
return 
$160-$170 million recovered for 
investors.  
CFO convicted and put on a 18 
month good behaviour bond. 
2003-
2008 
Opes Primeiii 600 
investors, 
$631 
million 
Investors advised to buy geared share 
portfolios and assign beneficial 
ownership of their holdings to Opes. 
Opes’ lent on behalf of ANZ and 
Merrill Lynch and took ownership of 
the scrip provided as collateral. Opes 
then lent that stock for a fee to short 
sellers, along with stock provided by 
institutional investors for a fee. 
Clients thought they owned share 
ended up losing their investment. 
Settlement of $253 million and 
return of around 40 cents in the 
dollar to creditors and investors. 
ANZ has agreed to improve 
compliance in various areas 
including reconciliation, 
compliance processes and risk 
management. 
2 directors jailed. 
 
Novem
ber 
2005 
and 
Septem
ber 
2009 
Trio/Astarraiv
 
$180 
million 
Trio was the trustee of 4 
superannuation funds and directed 
most assets into hedge funds located 
in the Caribbean. There is little 
evidence that the purported 
investments were actually made. 
Most of the money invested was lost. 
11 advisors jailed, banned, 
disqualified from managing 
companies or agreed to remove 
themselves from the industry for 
a total of more than 50 years. 
2003-
2010 
Sonray 
Capitalv 
3,000 
retail 
clients, 
$46 
million 
Theft, fraud and false accounting.  4,500 affected Investors to 
received 2/3 of their money 
back. Founder sentenced to six 
and a half years in prison. 
2006-
2010 
CBAvi Unclear 
but 
reports up 
to $300 
million 
Key finding of the senate inquiry 
include: 
 Unethical and dishonest conduct 
and breach of duties of a number of 
advisers working at CFPL. 
 CBA's compliance regime failed 
allowing unscrupulous advisers to 
continue operating. 
1,100 investors received $52m in 
compensation and CBA agreed 
to enforceable undertakings. 
2003-
2013 
ANZvii N/A ANZ Prime Access wealth package 
give customers priority access to 
financial planners, investment 
8,500 customers compensated 
$30m in total and 2 advisors 
dismissed. 
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monitoring alerts, and a documented 
annual review. ANZ failed to 
provide review to all customers.  
To 
2014 
NAB viii Unknown Inappropriate advice and practices 
and serious repeat compliance issues 
as well as cases of forgery of client 
signatures and file reconstructions. 
37 planners sacked (5 reported to 
ASIC), compensation payments 
to 700 customers totalling 
between $10 and $15 million  
All monetary figures are in Australian dollars.  
 
 
  
An examination of the more notable scandals identified in Table 1 highlights the 
issues involved. For example, Storm Financial promoted highly geared investments to clients 
even when such a strategy was inappropriate given the circumstances of the client. In late 
2008 / early 2009, Storm Financial collapsed costing some 14,000 investors A$3 billion (St 
John 2011). Macquarie Bank and CBA were involved in the Storm collapse by providing 
margin loans to Storm customers. In subsequent legal action and ASIC investigation CBA 
was found to have failed to issue timely margin call notices which ultimately led to many 
clients passing through their margin call trigger points and ending in negative equity (Storm 
Financial n.d.). Resulting litigation against CBA by Storm’s former clients ended in an 
estimated $270 million being paid out by CBA in 2013 (ASIC 2013).  
While the Storm collapse was playing out, a scandal involving CBAs own financial 
planning division Commonwealth Financial Planning Limited (CFPL) was developing. ASIC 
received warnings as early as October 2008 regarding a rogue planner operating within the 
bank, although the regulator delayed investigating the allegations for the next 16 months 
(Ferguson and Vedelago 2013). In 2013, the Australian media reported severe misconduct 
involving financial planners at CFPL, a systematic cover-up by management, and inadequate 
offers of compensation to complaining customers (Ferguson and Vedelago 2013). CFPL 
profited over many years from the lucrative commissions earned on risky investment 
products pushed hard by management and financial planners alike. In reference to the CBA 
Table 2 Financial Advisors Banned by ASIC  
Issue Number of advisors 
Misappropriated client money / theft 17 
Making statements that were false or misleading in a material particular 16 
Inducing clients to deal in financial products by making statements or forecasts that 
were misleading, false or deceptive. 
15 
Failing to have a reasonable basis for advice 13 
Failing to provide statements of advice 9 
Forged client signatures 5 
Operated without licence 5 
Became bankrupt  5 
Failing to provide product disclosure statements 4 
Failing to provide additional information when recommending the replacement of one 
financial product with another 
4 
Provided false trading and performance reports 4 
Falsified documents to earn commissions 4 
Used clients' money as collateral for his personal trading account without their 
authorisation. 
3 
Failed to maintain adequate records of advice 3 
Unauthorised trading 3 
Failed to act on client advice 2 
Allowing clients early release of superannuation 1 
Failed to invest the money as agreed 1 
Failed to repay the balance of the proceeds to the investors 1 
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case Greg Medcraft, the Chairman of ASIC, noted a CFPL culture focused only on short-term 
gains and profit as underpinning poor conduct (Rose, Eyers and Moullakis 2015). Allegations 
were bought to light in the media by a former employee and eventually triggered a bipartisan 
Senate inquiry (Commonwealth of Australia 2014a). The Senate inquiry noted: 
 
 “Advisers deliberately neglected their duties and placed their personal interests far 
above the interests of their clients. The assets of clients with conservative risk 
positions, such as retirees, were allocated into high-risk products without their 
knowledge to the financial benefit of the adviser, who received significant bonuses 
and recognition within CFPL as a 'high performer'. There was forgery and dishonest 
concealment of material facts. Clients lost substantial amounts of their savings when 
the global financial crisis hit; the crisis was also used to explain away the poor 
performance of portfolios.” (Commonwealth of Australia 2014a xviii). 
 
After the scandal involving CFPL became public, the Senate’s Economics Legislation 
Committee questioned ASIC about the CFPL matter and was clearly dissatisfied with ASIC's 
response. The Senate’s economic references committee accused ASIC of missing or ignoring 
persistent signs of wrongdoing and characterised it as a “timid, hesitant regulator” that was 
prepared to accept assurances from the bank that there were no grounds for intervention 
(Hurst and Chan 2014b). In its defence, ASIC CEO Greg Medcraft said that the regulator had 
just 30 staff available to monitor 40,000 financial planners. It was also noted that the 2014-15 
ASIC budget “has been reduced by $120 million” (Kirkland 2014).  
 
“The emerging revelations about the misconduct of financial advisers in CFPL and 
ASIC's failure to provide satisfactory answers in relation to this matter to the 
Economics Legislation Committee was the main catalyst for the (Senate) inquiry” 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2014b p.6).  
 
The final report of the Senate inquiry accused CBA of deliberately playing down the 
seriousness and extent of past problems within its financial planning division in an attempt to 
avoid ASIC scrutiny, contain adverse publicity and minimise compensation payments (Hurst 
and Chan 2014a). In response, CBA claimed to take the past events “very seriously” and had 
“worked openly and transparently with the Senate committee and ASIC throughout the 
inquiry” (Hurst and Chan 2014b). As a result of the publicity surrounding the CBA the CEO 
of the bank, Ian Narev, issued an apology to CFPL clients and offered them a full and open 
review of every portfolio.  
Both CBA and ASIC investigations of the events discussed in the inquiry revealed 
numerous issues, however they reached differing conclusions about the scale and seriousness 
of the issue. When a CBA internal review of the quality of advice given to customers was 
compared to ASIC’s evaluation it appeared that the CBA applied a much lower benchmark 
for what constituted acceptable quality. Of the 38 advisors whose advice was adversely 
assessed, only 12 were dismissed by the bank and it was noted that 20 of the 38 had generated 
over $120 million in gross sales (Ferguson 2014). 
Issues involving the ANZ bank revolved around a financial product called “Prime 
Access” which it offered to around 15,000 customers from 2003. Prime Access was a fee-for-
service package that included access to financial planners, investment monitoring alerts and 
an annual documented review of their financial situation. Many clients received only some of 
the services but were fully charged regardless of what they received (Ferguson 2015b). 
Despite ANZ indicating it would pay $30 million in compensation to around 8,500 
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customers, global wealth chief executive, Joyce Phillips, said the bank did not find any 
"systemic" problems in its advice function. 
The scandal involving NAB came to light when an internal report was published by the 
media. The report noted "We have suspended, terminated or ensured resignations of 31 NAB 
financial planners and aligned advisers over the past two years due to conflicts of interest, 
inappropriate advice, inappropriate practices or serious repeat compliance breaches" 
(Ferguson and Williams 2015). The report identified that there had been cases where planners 
had forged clients' signatures and manipulated clients' files in attempts at covering up poor 
compliance. Rather than being detected by the bank's internal controls, issues had come to 
light through complaints from clients or queries by regulators (Ferguson and Williams 2015).  
 
4. DISCUSSION 
There are several factors common to the scandals that have hit the industry in recent times. 
These factors include inappropriate remuneration structures driving sales of unsuitable 
products, poor management, and lack of experience in managing complex people, systems 
and processes as well as inadequate compliance oversight. Further the culture of the 
organizations involved has been questioned.  
Following several financial scandals involving the financial advice industry, an Inquiry 
was launched by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 
(PJCI). The findings of the committee were released in November 2009, with 
recommendations that involved regulation, training, education, professional standards, and 
adviser remuneration. In July 2012, the then federal labour government introduced regulatory 
reforms based on these recommendations known as the Future of Financial Advice (FOFA) 
reforms. The legislation amended the Corporations Act and introduced: 
 A prospective ban on conflicted remuneration structures, including commissions and 
volume based payments, in relation to the distribution of and advice about a range of 
retail investment products. 
 A duty for financial advisers to act in the best interests4 of their clients, subject to a 
'reasonable steps' qualification, and place the best interests of their clients ahead of their 
own when providing personal advice to retail clients. 
 An opt-in obligation that requires advice providers to renew their clients' agreement to 
ongoing fees every two years. 
 An annual fee disclosure statement requirement. 
 Enhanced powers for ASIC (ASIC 2015). 
 
FOFA added to and amended existing legislation covering the activities of financial 
advisors which are regulated by ASIC. Despite the scandals such as that involving CBA, in 
March 2014 the incoming Coalition government attempted to dilute the FOFA reforms. In 
response, Labour Senator Dastyari and independent Senator Xenophon organised a "coalition 
of common sense" which bought together Labour, the Greens and independent Senators 
Lambie, Madigan and Muir to vote down the Coalition's FOFA wind back.  
Current licensing and training requirements of financial collapse in Australia can be 
traced back to the Financial Services Reform Act (2001) and subsequent release of Policy 
Statement 146, known as 'Regulatory Guide 146: Licensing: training of financial product 
advisers' (RG146), by ASIC. In order to provide financial product advice in Australia, 
                                                            
4 For a detailed discussion and analysis of the ‘best interests’ duty see Bruhn and Miller (2014).  
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advisors are required to meet the educational and professional experience requirements 
specified in RG 146.  
RG146 establishes set minimum training requirements in the context of product advice 
with a basic RG146 course to qualify as a financial planner often taking less than eight days 
to complete in an open-book, non-supervised environment. and most financial advisers 
receive their training by private providers in the vocational training sector (Bruce and Gupta 
2011). Bruce and Gupta (2011) argue that the lack of higher education qualifications among 
the majority of the trained financial adviser workforce is an impediment to the development 
of a financial advice profession in Australia. 
The largest professional association representing financial planners and advisors in 
Australia, the Financial Planning Association (FPA), offers the CFP Certification Program. 
The program comprises five units; two of which are compulsory (one of which is ethics) 
while the other units focus on technical and strategy development. Candidates may get 
exemption from non compulsory units if they have completed accredited studies in an 
approved post-graduate level program. There are several FPA accredited financial planning 
courses offered by Australian universities which meet the requirements of RG146. The FPA 
has set a requirement of a bachelor's degree as the main entry point for its CFP Program. 
While the FPA is the dominant industry association, a significant proportion of the industry 
are not FPA members and do not have degree qualifications.  
RG146 training as delivered by vocational training organisations has been subjected to 
criticism particularly in relation to widely reported cheating on exams. For example, in CBA’s 
West Australian division, two experienced planners were dismissed in 2014 for having junior 
staff sit tests for them (Ferguson 2015a). More recently, an investigation by ASIC into fund 
manager IOOF revealed that head of advice research, Peter Hilton, had junior staff complete 
training modules (online training modules from private vocational training provider, Kaplan) 
on his behalf as well as compliance training. (Ferguson 2015a). 
One issue not addressed by the Senate inquiry or proposed reforms relates to the structure 
of the Australian financial system. The central feature of the Australian Financial Services 
Industry is the "vertically integrated" model which allows banks to both create investment 
products and sell them through their financial advice networks mainly to their customers. 
ASIC has indicated that there is an "inherent" conflict of interest within this model and the 
recent Financial System Inquiry report (Commonwealth of Australia 2014a) called for vertical 
integration to be actively monitored. Industry concentration and vertical integration together 
raise the spectre of excessive risk taking and moral hazard particularly in the absence of a 
well resourced and committed regulatory regime.  
Following the Senate Inquiry the Australian government initiated an inquiry into the 
Financial System (Commonwealth of Australia 2014b). The inquiry acknowledged that 
effective disclosure and financial literacy were necessary but not sufficient to deliver 
satisfactory consumer outcomes. It also acknowledged the need for improved firm culture. 
The Chairman of the Inquiry, David Murray (Murray 2014) noted "Our recommendations are 
not meant to absolve consumers of responsibility for their choices or insulate them from 
market risk. Rather they are intended to reduce the risk of consumers being sold poor quality 
or unsuitable products". The problem remains thought that recent financial scandals have 
involved the theft of client money and even forgery. Court cases and compensation schemes 
can take considerable resources and time and may only provide partial compensation. 
Banning advisors may help remove rogue elements and dissuade others from following 
provided the regulator is adequately resourced and determined. 
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5. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
While commission based compensation models may work in competitive markets such as the 
US, the Australian financial services industry is highly concentrated and not as competitive as 
the US and other markets. Hence the flat fee model is being proposed as better and less 
conflicted alternative. As Robinson (2007) notes however, all compensation models have 
limitations.  
The cases of fraud and theft of investor money described earlier would in all 
likelihood not have been stopped by changing compensation models or improving advisor 
education and training. Despite financial planning training courses incorporating elements of 
ethical practice, examples of unethical behaviour continue. There is little empirical evidence 
that ethics training and education can change the behaviour of people.  Are improved methods 
of recruitment and selection of staff needed? 
The highly concentrated and vertically integrated Australian financial services 
industry has developed over time with successive governments allowing (in most cases) the 
four major banks to acquire smaller banks, fund management companies and insurers over 
many years. AMP has survived due to its status as the major life insurance provider in 
Australia. It could be argued that the dominance of the major financial institutions in the 
market, and the moral hazard this has created, has manifested in a culture of excessive risk 
taking. Banks can effectively “bet the ranch” and take excessive risks with depositors money 
in the knowledge that any investigation into potential wrong doing will take years, that the 
regulator, ASIC, is under resourced, and that penalties for misconduct are perceived by many 
to be relatively trivial. In the unlikely event an investigation results in a prosecution the 
question remains whether the size, severity and scope of penalties are sufficient to provide an 
effective deterrent, particularly considering that the major organisations that dominate the 
industry have balance sheets in the billions. 
A partial solution to the inherent conflict of interest which exists may lay in the 
introduction of a US style Glass–Steagall Act or antitrust legislation where retail and 
commercial banking activities are separated. Breaking the connection between product 
originators may be a necessary step in changing the culture of the financial advice industry. 
The political reality is that the Australian banks collectively and individually have immense 
political power and such regulatory change may be difficult. Some time ago Zingales (2004) 
wrote in relation to the US managed funds industry “it is difficult to see how this ideal 
regulation could emerge from the political process, which tends to be dominated by 
incumbent funds” this same argument could be extended to Australia’s highly concentrated 
financial services industry.  
Information asymmetry exists in the relationship between the product originators and 
financial advisors as well as financial advisors and their clients. Advisors need appropriate 
training and education while consumers of financial services need to be better informed to 
reduce information asymmetry. Addressing the financial literacy of advisors through higher 
mandated educational requirements would appear to be an appropriate positive step.  While 
the benefits of financial literacy training have been questioned there appears to be consensus 
that basic literacy and numeracy are positively correlated with financial literacy. Improving 
basic literacy and numeracy is particularly important as those with less education have been 
identified as being more likely to make financial mistakes than highly educated individuals. 
Improving basic literacy and numeracy at a school level would necessitate increased funding 
to less advantaged (mainly government / public) schools but this too is a political ‘hot potato’. 
Financial counselling may also have a role in the case of adults with low literacy and 
numeracy levels who face a financial crisis and need immediate assistance.  
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The Australian government has now endorsed all but one of the recommendations of 
the Financial Systems Inquiry report (Commonwealth of Australia 2014b). Financial advisors 
will now be required to have minimum degree qualifications, membership of a professional 
association and adherence to a code of conduct along with completion of a professional year 
prior to registration. The government will also introduce legislation to make the issuers and 
distributors of financial products more accountable. They have also announced that they will 
develop legislation to give ASIC the power to ban individuals from managing financial firms, 
and that they will consult on strengthening ASIC's enforcement tools in relation to the 
financial services and credit licensing regimes. While these initiatives as well as those under 
FOFA go some way to addressing the underlying issues causing the enormous losses to 
consumers in recent years, they do guarantee the will to investigate and prosecute 
wrongdoing. Neither do they enhance the financial decision making ability of the most 
vulnerable consumers or address the underlying structural issue of the vertically integrated 
model at the heart of the industry. Without changes in this respect the risk of information 
asymmetry, adverse selection and moral hazard and their consequences persist. 
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